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BUG's last paragraph

For those (like me) waiting to see BUG (my book Being Up For Grabs out, I post the last paragraph included in the book. It is not the last one in the book, but will appear almost towards the end. The second round of proofs is done so it looks like September will be its season.

In order to deal with the plurality akin to contingency, I have introduced three ontoscopies. The idea in each case is to show that, because not everything is up for grabs and sumbebeka prota ton onton, there is a structure around contingency either making it possible or following from it. Each ontoscopy is a way to view contingency – it can be described as point of view about what is up for grabs. It is interesting to pursue this line for a moment now that we are coming towards the close of the book. We can then find, at least, three points of view: that of the agents, that of the resulting action and a transversal point of view where the effects of agents on actions are considered in a pair with the effects of actions on agents. These three points of view correspond to the three ontoscopies: the monadology of fragments, the ontology of doubts and the rhythm-oriented metaphysics. It is clear that contingency is transcendent if we take the second point of view, but not the others – as the resulting action will involve indeterminacies no matter what the agents engage in doing. If we see the ontoscopies along these lines, we can associate them to the three different modes of existence that the monadology of fragments, the first ontoscopy, affords. The first point of view is that of composers – of agents performing their action. The second of compositions – the resulting doubtful output of all agents. The third of fragments as they are simultaneously available to composers and part in a composition. Modes of existence are not ontoscopies, yet each one arguably entail a point of view. If this is so, the first ontoscopy, postulating three modes of existence, prefigures the overall picture.

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